moral relativism: "feet firmly planted in mid-air"* (part 2)

Back in March, I promised to complete at a later date a two-part post presenting and then refuting the view of moral relativism. Looks like that later date is today.

Just to recap, in part one, Francis J. Beckwith shared with us a couple of things. First, he explicated what moral relativism is in the first place. In his words, it is "the view that when it comes to questions of morality, there is no absolute or objective right or wrong; moral rules are merely personal preferences and/or the result of one's cultural, sexual, or ethnic orientation"[1]. He went on to present several arguments used to support it; namely those "from cultural and individual differences." The basic contention among these arguments is that, because there are so many diverse cultures and such a vast array of moral beliefs among individuals, there can't possibly be such a thing as universal morality. Beckwith responded to this false claim with two arguments which he delineated in detail: relativism does not follow from disagreement, and disagreement counts against relativism. Click here to read those arguments.

But there is a second genre of arguments used to support moral relativism; they can be summarized as coming "from tolerance." These are probably the arguments I hear the most, and I suspect my friends who are moral absolutists encounter them often, too. Arguments from tolerance are wildly popular in America today, utilized to defend all kinds of moral atrocities, but especially abortion.

Beckwith writes:

Argument from Tolerance

Many people see relativism as necessary for promoting tolerance, non-judgmentalism, and inclusiveness, for they think if you believe your moral position is correct and others' incorrect you are closed-minded and intolerant. They usually base this premise on the well-known differences of opinion on morality between cultures and individuals. So, the moral relativist embraces the view that one should not judge other cultures and individuals, for to do so would be intolerant. There are at least four problems with this argument, all of which maintain that tolerance (rightly understood) and relativism are actually incompatible with each other.

Tolerance supports objective morality, not relativism

Ironically, the call to tolerance by relativists presupposes the existence of at least one nonrelative, universal, and objective norm: tolerance... [I]f everyone ought to be tolerant, then tolerance is an objective moral norm. And therefore, moral relativism is false. Also, tolerance presupposes that there is something good about being tolerant, such as being able to learn from others with whom one disagrees or impart knowledge and wisdom to that person. But that presupposes objective moral values, namely, that knowledge and wisdom are good things. Moreover, tolerance presupposes that someone may be correct about his or her moral perspective. That is to say, it seems that part of the motivation for advocating tolerance is to encourage people to be open to the possibility that one may be able to gain truth and insight (including moral truth and insight) from another who may possess it. If that is the case, then there are objective moral truths one can learn.

In addition, tolerance presupposes a moral judgment of another's viewpoint. That is to say, I can only be tolerant of those ideas that I think are mistaken. I am not tolerant of that with which I agree; I embrace it. And I am not tolerant of that for which I have no interest (e.g., European professional soccer); I merely have benign neglect for it. (That is, I don't care one way or another.)

Relativism is itself a closed-minded and intolerant position

After all, the relativist dogmatically asserts that there is no moral truth. To illustrate this, consider a dialogue (based loosely on a real-life exchange) between a high school teacher and her student Elizabeth. The teacher instructs her class, "Welcome, students. This is the first day of class, and so I want to lay down some ground rules. First, because no one has the truth about morality, you should be open-minded to the opinions of your fellow students." The teacher recognizes the raised hand of Elizabeth who asks, "If nobody has the truth, isn't that a good reason for me not to listen to my fellow students? After all, if nobody has the truth, why should I waste my time listening to other people and their opinions? What's the point? Only if somebody has the truth does it make sense to be open-minded. Don't you agree?"

"No, I don't. Are you claiming to know the truth? Isn't that a bit arrogant and dogmatic?"

"Not at all. Rather I think it's dogmatic, as well as arrogant, to assert that no single person on earth knows the truth. After all, have you met every single person in the world and quizzed them exhaustively? If not, how can you make such a claim? Also, I believe it is actually quite the opposite of arrogance to say that I will alter my opinions to fit the truth whenever and wherever I find it. And if I happen to think I have good reason to believe I do know the truth and would like to share it with you, why wouldn't you listen to me? Why would you automatically discredit my opinion before it is even uttered? I thought we were supposed to listen to everyone's opinion."

Relativism is judgmental, exclusivist, and partisan

This may seem like an odd thing to say as the relativist would like you to think his viewpoint is nonjudgmental, inclusivist, and neutral when it comes to moral beliefs. But consider the following.

First, the relativist says if you believe in objective moral truth, you are wrong. Hence, relativism is judgmental. Second, it follows from this that relativism is excluding your beliefs from the realm of legitimate options. Thus, relativism is exclusivist. And third, because relativism is exclusivist, all nonrelativists are automatically not members of the "correct thinking" party. So, relativism is partisan.

Tolerance only makes sense within the framework of a moral order, for it is within such a framework that one can morally justify tolerating some things while not tolerating others. For tolerance without a moral framework, or absolute tolerance, leads to a dogmatic relativism, and thus to an intolerance of any viewpoint that does not embrace relativism. It is no wonder that in such a climate of "tolerance" any person who maintains that there is an objective moral order to which society ought to subscribe is greeted with contempt.

The "tolerance" of moral relativism either condones barbarism or is self-refuting.

As I pointed out above, some moral relativists embrace tolerance because they believe that such a posture is appropriate given the diversity of moral and cultural traditions in the world today. Humanist author Xiaorong Li points out the fallacy in this reasoning:

But the existence of moral diversity does no more to justify that we ought to respect different moral values than the existence of disease, hunger, torture, and slavery do to justify that we ought to value them. Empirical claims thus are not suitable as the basis for developing moral principles such as "Never judge other cultures" or "We ought to tolerate different values." ...

What if the respected or tolerated culture disrespects and advocates violence against individuals who dissent? When a girl fights to escape female genital circumcision or foot-binding or arranged marriage, or when a widow does not want to be burned to death to honor her dead husband, the relativist is obligated to "respect" the cultural or traditional customs from which the individuals are trying to escape. In doing so, the relativist is not merely disrespecting the individual but effectively endorsing the moral ground for rape, torture, and murder. On moral issues, ethical relativists cannot possibly remain neutral- they are committed either to the individual or to the dominant force within the culture.

Relativists have made explicit one central value- equal respect and tolerance of other ways of life, which they insist to be absolute and universal. Ethical relativism is thus repudiated by itself.

Let's be intellectually honest when it comes to evaluating moral relativism. If it is what one is using to justify abortion, but meanwhile it doesn't make sense, there is too much at stake in the debate to hold onto it for the sake of holding onto it. If a viewpoint is flawed, give it up.

Vita Pro Omni!

* Francis J. Beckwith and Gregory Koukl wrote an insightful book on this topic that I would recommend called Relativism: Feet Firmly Planted in Mid-Air

[1] Francis J. Beckwith, Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice (p. 3)